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ness, sensibility, pleasure and pain, the inclinations and tendencies, sentiments, passions and emotions. Our author then investigates the nature of intelligence, bodily impressions and the nature of sensation and perception, including the theories of nativism, empiricism, the association of ideas, imagination, attention, abstraction, generalisation, judgment, reason, and language.

A shorter but no less important part is the study of activity, will and habit, special attention being paid to the problems of freedom and the part which habit plays in mental life. An entire chapter is devoted to animal psychology in which Condillac, Lamarck, and Spencer and Darwin are quoted and criticised.

The chapter on art treats such subjects as the nature of art, the means employed by art, art and craft, the emotions roused by art, the realism of art, religious art, the beautiful and the sublime, the pretty and the ridiculous.

An entirely different field is covered in the second part of the book, pages 337 ff., which are devoted to logic, covering the field of formal logic and methodology, comprising the methods of the nature sciences, the nature of hypothesis, the methods of the moral sciences and sophisms.

Under the main head of Metaphysics, our author discusses the several psychological explanations, especially the materialistic, the spiritualistic, and after an elaborate investigation of the question of liberty, he gives an exposition of the contrast of determinism and fatalism. The second part of Metaphysics takes up a discussion of rational cosmology with its several solutions. A whole chapter entitled "Théodicée" enters into the several arguments of the existence of God, and contrasts theism with pantheism and atheism.

Professor Dunan's epistemology discusses the relativity of knowledge, the criterion of error, the proposition of scepticism, and concludes with the affirmation that a universal and necessary philosophy exists, and that this philosophy is the spiritualistic. Our author grants that there are difficulties, but spiritualism alone can explain the existence of intelligence.

The last part of Professor Dunan's book is devoted to ethics. He discusses the principles of ethics, the nature of conscience, the moral law, responsibility, the problem of the ought, personal duties and social duties.

The whole work is thoughtful, albeit in parts pedantic and although to some expositions, scientists, especially those who are devoted to what is commonly called the natural sciences, will make serious objections, it is, considering its standpoint, a fairly impartial elucidation of the several philosophical problems, the main aim being, as stated by the author in the preface to establish "the existence of a personal god, man's freedom of will and moral responsibility, and the existence of another life than the one which we have now in the sensible world.

P. C.

PRINCIPES DE GÉOMÉTRIE. Par *E. Delsol*. Paris: C. Naud. Pages, 97.

Monsieur Delsol, a civil and mining engineer of Paris, proposes in this little book on the principles of geometry a new system which in its general outlines is

closely allied to the expositions on the foundation of geometry which have been set forth in *The Monist* during the last year.

Monsieur Delsol himself sums up his proposition in a summary of the introduction as follows: "Pure geometry is a science *a priori*, which admits neither of hypothesis, nor postulates, nor axioms," and we cannot but say that this maxim is heartily endorsed by the editor of *The Monist*.

M. Delsol continues: "If my reasoning *a priori* is susceptible of verification by experience, the conclusions to which it leads are naturally laws of the exterior world. The laws which the exterior world seems to obey are no others than those which govern our understanding. Man if transferred to another world would preserve the same ideas *a priori*."

M. Delsol's theory is based upon the principle of distinction which involves divisibility and makes it that the exterior world can be considered as consisting of parts. The result is the concept of series involving the idea of number, and here M. Delsol contemplates the notion infinite and continuous. He defines his view of equality, of number, of zero, of positive and negative numbers, addition, multiplication, etc. We cannot say that M. Delsol is happy in these important details and his definitions will scarcely prove satisfactory to mathematicians, least of all to those trained in the modern modes of thought. The definition of a point, for instance, seems to us artificial. It is given at the start of Chapter II. as the result of the series α, β, γ , ending in a last term which is characterised by the fact of being indivisible, and M. Delsol calls it "the geometrical point." The straight line is arrived at after a consideration of two intersecting circles, and he says: "The straight line is accordingly a line such as only one can pass through two given points. There is no other which would be equal to it, or to be short and use the usual way of speech, it is one of which only one passes through two points." Surface, line, and point are characterised in the usual way as boundaries, the surface as separating two parts of space, the line of a surface, and the point of a line, but here M. Delsol finds a new aspect. "Suppose the points A and B limit the arc AB , and this arc be considered in itself not as a partition of the rest of the circle." In that case the points do not separate, but are only the extremities of the arc, and thus he finds himself necessitated to invent a new name to distinguish this kind of a point from the one defined above. He calls it the "*sous-point*," saying, "accordingly, we call *sous-point* the end of a line that is not closed (*non-fermée*) and *sous-line* the boundary of a surface that is not closed, which is the locus of the extremities of lines in a surface that is not closed" (p. 48). Upon analogous modes of reason, M. Delsol introduces the idea of *sous-spheres* and *sous-straight*s (Chapt. III.). M. Delsol arrives at the conclusion that the Euclidean geometry is the only possible *a priori*. Time, number, and space is the triple emanation of the principle of distinction applied to the exterior world. He points out in the appendix that the non-Euclidean geometries do not agree with experience, and he scorns

the objections of their representatives. It is impossible to interpret experience by different geometries, for only one of them can be true.

While we confess that the underlying tendencies of M. Delsol's explanation of the principles of geometry have fundamental points of contact with the theory set forth in *The Monist*, we cannot regard the details of his exposition as a solution of the difficulties in question.

P. C.

AN INTRODUCTORY STUDY OF ETHICS. By *Warner Fite*. New York, London, and Bombay : Longmans, Green, and Co. 1903. Pages, xi, 383.

Prof. Warner Fite treats the subject of ethics mainly by contrasting hedonism with idealism, the ethics of happiness with the ethics of conscience and principle. He sides with neither party, but points out the necessity of a compromise. We may characterise his book by quoting the following passages :

"The moral problem is the expression of a conflict between our aspirations toward an ideally perfect and complete human life and the limiting conditions.

"The hedonist proposes to ignore the ideal considerations and to conform strictly to the conditions. For in these conditions, he claims, we discover the real ground of things. The world of which we are a part is a world of mechanical forces. It is therefore bound to work itself out in its own way and in its own time. No effort of ours will either accelerate the process or retard it. Therefore let us study its workings, conform to its movements, and be content with the comfort and happiness which it affords us. The idealist, on the other hand, urges us to ignore the conditions and to devote ourselves immediately to the pursuit of ideal ends. From his point of view, it is in the ideals, and not in the conditions, that we are to discover the real ground of things. The conditions by which we are hemmed in are after all mere negation. They represent nothing but the absence of self-consciousness,—or, in social terms, nothing but the absence of mutual sympathy and understanding. Therefore let us set out immediately and directly toward the attainment of the highest personal and social ideals.

"Though we cannot bring the two ends of our problem quite together, still it remains *a priori* conceivable that they may be brought together. In chapter xvi, it is pointed out that the conceptions of a world determined by mechanical forces and of a world determined by reason or consciousness, upon which the two sides of the problem rest, are not logically contradictory but only empirically irreconcilable.

"The practical significance of the moral situation may then be summarised as follows: Our human life is permanently problematic. We never reach a point either of complete realisation of ideals or of complete conformity to conditions. At every point of our existence we stand between two immediately contradictory demands, those of our ideals and those of our conditions. Theoretically, the two ought not to be ultimately incompatible, but practically they cannot be wholly reconciled; and our duty will not admit of an exclusive attention to either. It